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Cognition all the way down 2.0

The problem it addresses

The basal cognition debate (a strand of the Diverse Intelligence program) is stuck on a definitional deadlock: proponents ascribe “learning”, “memory”, and “decision-making” to cells, tissues, and molecular networks; skeptics charge that these are metaphorical dilutions of concepts whose semantics were fixed for brains. Chis-Ciure & Levin try to dissolve the deadlock by replacing the umbrella concept “cognition” with a single, substrate-agnostic, measurable quantity: how efficiently a system searches its problem space relative to blind chance.

A lexicon for problem spaces

They extend Newell & Simon’s (1972) symbolic problem-solving into a scale-agnostic quintuple:

P=S,O,C,E,HP = \langle S, O, C, E, H\rangle
  • SS — physically realisable states (incl. initial SinitS_{\text{init}} and goal SgoalS_{\text{goal}}).
  • OOoperators, elementary transitions o:SSo : S \to S, each costed by a weight w:OR0w : O \to \mathbb{R}_{\ge 0} (in physical units — Joules, ATP).
  • CCconstraints, forbidden state–operator pairs (the nomologically possible paths).
  • EE — an evaluation functional SRS \to \mathbb{R} (a fitness proxy; in a variational reading, free energy).
  • HH — the horizon, the forward look-ahead depth (set by intrinsic timescales / delay lines).

Constraints, evaluation, and horizon are promoted to first-class elements because biological agents modulate them directly — relaxing a constraint or re-tiling the landscape is itself a fingerprint of intelligence, not just navigation within a fixed space.

Intelligence as search efficiency

Intelligence (in William James’s sense — a fixed goal reached by variable means) is operationalised as a scalar. Let τblind\tau_{\text{blind}} be the expected cost of a maximal-entropy random walk on the admissible graph to reach a goal, and τagent\tau_{\text{agent}} the cost under the agent’s policy. Then:

K=log10 ⁣(τblindτagent)K = \log_{10}\!\left(\frac{\tau_{\text{blind}}}{\tau_{\text{agent}}}\right)

KK counts orders of magnitude of dissipative work saved relative to chance. K=0K=0 is chance; K=nK=n is 10n10^{n}-fold more efficient. Because both numerator and denominator scale with the combinatorial size of PP, KK is scale-invariant and normalised for task difficulty; it is in physical work units, and it is additive across conditionally independent sub-problems (Ktotal=jKjK_{\text{total}} = \sum_j K_j), hence compositional across nested scales. Crucially, KK is only as good as its null model — an unfairly handicapped τblind\tau_{\text{blind}} inflates it — so the random walk must run in the exact same PP.

Two worked estimates

SystemProblem spaceKKReading
Dictyostelium chemotaxiscortical-patch occupancy under a cAMP gradient2.2\approx 2.2~150–200× faster than a random walk (≈7 bits of path-information)
Planarian head regeneration (BaCl₂)~2,700-gene expression manifold21\approx 21finds a ~10-gene resistance solution in 37 days vs an astronomical blind search (102110^{21}×)

Both are computed against deliberately conservative (intelligence-underestimating) null models, so they are lower bounds. Even “simple” organisms prune combinatorial explosions by hundreds- to sextillion-fold.

The claim

The “mark of the cognitive” is best sought not in neurons but in the measurable efficiency with which living systems traverse energy and information gradients to tame combinatorial explosions — “one problem space at a time.” The additive decomposition of KK across nested scales pinpoints where and by how much intelligence condenses, rendering the “obvious” superiority over chance measurable and therefore refutable. The account connects downstream to the Free Energy Principle (with EE as variational free energy and optimal trajectories as least-action flows) and to algorithmic-complexity / minimum-description-length notions of efficient computation.


References

Chis-Ciure & Levin (2025), Synthese 206:257 · Newell & Simon (1972), Human Problem Solving · Fields & Levin (2022), Entropy 24, 819 · Lyon (2020), Adaptive Behavior 28, 407 · Friston (2010), Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 11, 127 · Emmons-Bell et al. (2019), iScience 22, 147 · Levin (2022), Front. Syst. Neurosci. 16, 768201.